Reinsurance or Securitization: The Case of Natural Catastrophe Risk by Gibson, Rajna et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2014
Reinsurance or Securitization: The Case of Natural Catastrophe Risk
Gibson, Rajna; Habib, Michel; Ziegler, Alexandre
Abstract: We investigate the suitability of securitization as an alternative to reinsurance for the purpose
of transferring natural catastrophe risk. We characterize the conditions under which one or the other form
of risk transfer dominates using a setting in which reinsurers and traders in financial markets produce
costly information about catastrophes. Such information is useful to insurers: along with the information
produced by insurers themselves, it reduces insurers’ costly capital requirements. However, traderswho
seek to benefit from trading in financial markets may produce ‘too much’ information,thereby making
risk transfer through securitization prohibitively costly.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.05.007
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-62390
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Gibson, Rajna; Habib, Michel; Ziegler, Alexandre (2014). Reinsurance or Securitization: The Case of Nat-
ural Catastrophe Risk. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 53:79-100. DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.05.007
Reinsurance or Securitization:
The Case of Natural Catastrophe Risk
Rajna Gibson Michel A. Habib Alexandre Ziegler
Gibson: University of Geneva and Swiss Finance Institute, Boulevard du Pont d'Arve 14, 1211 Geneva,
Switzerland, tel.: +41-(0)22-379-8983, e-mail: Rajna.Gibson@unige.ch. Habib: University of Zurich and
Swiss Finance Institute, Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland, tel.: +41-(0)44-634-2507, fax: +41-
(0)44-634-4903, e-mail: michel.habib@bf.uzh.ch; CEPR; DEEP, University of Lausanne. Ziegler: University
of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute, Plattenstrasse 32, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland, tel.: +41-(0)44-634-2732,
fax: +41-(0)44-634-4903, e-mail: alexandre.ziegler@bf.uzh.ch. We wish to thank Pauline Barrieu, Jan Bena,
Charles Cuny, Benjamin Croitoru, Marco Elmer, Henrik Hakenes, Pablo Koch, Henri Louberge, Richard
Phillips, Peter Sohre, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, and seminar participants at the CEPR Conference on
Corporate Finance and Risk Management in Solstrand, the EFA meetings in Ljubljana, the Environmen-
tal Finance Conference at the University of Warwick, the EPFL, the ESSFM in Gerzensee, Simon Fraser
University, the SCOR-JRI Conference on New Forms of Risk Sharing and Risk Engineering in Paris, the
Symposium on Banking, Finance, and Insurance at the University of Karlsruhe, and the Universities of
Aberdeen, Geneva, Konstanz, Oxford, Rimini, and Zurich, for helpful comments and discussions, and Swiss
Re for providing illustrative data. Financial support by the National Centre of Competence in Research
\Financial Valuation and Risk Management" (NCCR FINRISK), the Swiss National Science Foundation
(grant no. PP001{102717), and the URPP \Finance and Financial Markets" is gratefully acknowledged.
Reinsurance or Securitization:
The Case of Natural Catastrophe Risk
Abstract
We investigate the suitability of securitization as an alternative to reinsurance for
the purpose of transferring natural catastrophe risk. We characterize the conditions
under which one or the other form of risk transfer dominates using a setting in which
reinsurers and traders in nancial markets produce costly information about catastro-
phes. Such information is useful to insurers: along with the information produced by
insurers themselves, it reduces insurers' costly capital requirements. However, traders
who seek to benet from trading in nancial markets may produce `too much' in-
formation. This instance of the Hirshleifer eect may make risk transfer through
securitization prohibitively costly.
1 Introduction
Traditional catastrophe reinsurance has in recent years come under scrutiny in the academic
literature. In his study of the market for catastrophe risk, Froot (2001) shows that insurers
should optimally reinsure against large catastrophic events rst. Moreover, since catastrophe
risks are uncorrelated with aggregate nancial wealth, reinsurance premia should reect
expected losses. Both of these conjectures are invalidated by Froot's study of the aggregate
prole of reinsurance purchases: insurers tend to reinsure medium-size losses, but retain
(rather than reinsure) their large-event risks; the reinsurance premia they pay often are a
multiple of expected losses. Froot explains these phenomena mainly by the ineciencies that
characterize the supply of capital to reinsurance companies and by these companies' excessive
market power. Doherty (1997) argues that these ineciencies of the reinsurance market
should spur the development of alternate forms of risk transfer, such as securities traded on
nancial markets. Because nancial markets can draw on a larger, more liquid and more
diversied pool of capital than the equity of reinsurance companies, they should have a strong
advantage over reinsurance in nancing catastrophe risk (Durbin, 2001). Cummins andWeiss
(2009) document the growing use of securitization in nancial markets to transfer catastrophe
risk. They provide evidence of market takeo, especially as regards catastrophe bonds. As
noted by Cummins and Weiss, the success of over-the-counter (OTC) traded catastrophe
bonds has not extended to exchange-traded catastrophe instruments: there has been little
to no interest in the futures and option contracts introduced by exchanges as diverse as the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the Bermuda Commodities Exchange (BCOE), the New
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and the
Insurance Futures Exchange (IFEX); at the time of writing, only the contracts introduced
in 2007 by the CME appear still to be trading, at low volumes.
In this study, we compare reinsurance and securitization in nancial markets for the
purpose of transferring natural catastrophe risk and characterize the conditions under which
one or the other form of risk transfer dominates. We consider the case of an insurer exposed
to natural catastrophe risk. The insurer seeks to supplement the costly information it has
produced about possible losses with information obtained from a reinsurer or from prices in
nancial markets. Such information is valuable to the insurer, for it decreases that insurer's
costly capital requirements: the better the insurer understands the risk to which it is exposed,
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the lesser the amount of capital the insurer needs to guard against such risk. The insurer
also seeks to take advantage of the reinsurer and the nancial markets' lower cost of capital.
Reinsurers are considered to have lower cost of capital than insurers because they are larger
and more diversied. The nancial markets' cost of capital is low for two reasons: i) margin
requirements in nancial markets dier from equity investments in reinsurance companies
in not involving the agency problems that raise the cost of external capital;1 ii) natural
catastrophe risk has had low correlation with aggregate wealth (Cummins and Weiss, 2009).
We ask which form of risk transfer, reinsurance or securitization in nancial markets,
minimizes the total cost of bearing catastrophe risk to the insurer. Total cost includes the
cost of the capital that must be held by the insurer, that of the capital that must be held by
the reinsurer to which a fraction of the risk has been transferred, and the cost of producing the
information that helps both insurer and reinsurer decrease capital requirements and provides
informed traders in nancial markets with the opportunity to prot at the expense of liquidity
traders. We nd that informed traders who seek to benet from trading in nancial markets
may in some cases produce more information than warranted by the primary objective of
decreasing insurer capital requirements; there is `too much' information. This is an instance
of the `Hirshleifer Eect' (Hirshleifer, 1971); it is costly to insurers, who bear the cost of
information production through the discount they must oer liquidity traders to compensate
these traders for the losses they expect to sustain informed traders.
We use a rich setting to investigate the key factors that aect the relative cost of risk
transfer through reinsurance and securitization. In our setting, there are xed and variable
costs to producing information; the larger the variable costs incurred, the higher the quality
of the information. There is also some substitution between xed and variable costs, in the
sense that the aggregation of many pieces of lower quality information can result in a higher
quality piece of aggregated information. Such aggregation characterizes nancial markets
(Grossman, 1989); the increase in information quality it makes possible is greater, the more
complementary|the less redundant|the many pieces of information produced by informed
traders.
We nd that the production of too much information at too high a cost in nancial
markets is more likely i) where the xed costs of producing information are high, ii) where
1See Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Froot and Stein (1998), and Froot (2007) for a discussion of
such costs. We discuss this issue in further detail in Section 3.3.2.
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the variable costs of producing information are low, iii) where there are many liquidity
traders, and iv) where losses are highly uncertain. To understand the intuition for these
results, recall that reinsurance and securitization in nancial markets represent two alter-
native mechanisms for providing the insurer with information. Financial markets are at a
disadvantage where it is preferable to have one party|the reinsurer|produce a single piece
of high quality information to supplement that produced by the insurer than to have many
parties|informed traders in nancial markets|produce numerous pieces of generally lower
quality information. Where variable costs are low relative to xed costs, the indirect produc-
tion of high quality information through aggregation in nancial markets is less ecient than
the direct production of that information by a single reinsurer that incurs both the xed and
the variable costs of producing high quality information; reinsurance dominates securitiza-
tion. Such dominance is generally compounded by the presence of many liquidity traders
and by large uncertainty about losses: the greater the presence of liquidity traders and loss
uncertainty, the greater informed traders' prot opportunities, the greater these traders' in-
centive to produce information for the purpose of taking advantage of these opportunities;
this exacerbates the problem of excess information production in nancial markets. Result
iv) is consistent with Hagendor, Hagendor, and Keasey's (2010) nding that stock mar-
ket reaction to catastrophe bond issuance is higher for issuers with less volatile loss ratios.
Result iii) is consistent with the aforementioned success of catastrophe bonds and relative
failure of exchange-traded catastrophe futures and options: there are few, if any liquidity
traders in OTC markets, unlike in exchanges.2
Redundancy in the information produced|how similar are the pieces of information
produced by informed traders in the nancial markets|favors reinsurance where there is
large loss uncertainty and securitization in nancial markets where there is little. Where large
loss uncertainty elicits the need for information to supplement that produced by the insurer,
there is much ineciency producing numerous pieces of redundant information; redundancy
favors reinsurance over securitization. Where, in contrast, there is little loss uncertainty
and little need for supplemental information, redundancy decreases informed traders' prot
opportunities, thereby deterring these traders' entry. There is little information production
in nancial markets, which come to dominate reinsurance by virtue of their lower cost of
2Most catastrophe bonds have been sold under Rule 144A to Qualied Institutional Buyers (QIBs); few
QIBs can be considered liquidity traders, in the sense of consistently sustaining trading losses to informed
traders.
3
capital.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents and
solves our model of an insurer that seeks to transfer a fraction of the risks he has insured
either through reinsurance or through securitization. Section 4 considers the two polar
cases of no and full redundancy for the purpose of providing some preliminary intuition
and illustrating some of the tradeos involved. Section 5 identies the determinants of the
preferred forms of risk transfer. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our paper is in the line of a number of papers that have compared private and public
nancing; in our case, reinsurance is private nancing and securitization public. Examples
of such papers are Bolton and Freixas (2000), Boot and Thakor (1997), Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1994), and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999). In many of these papers, the basic
problems are those of moral hazard and adverse selection. We acknowledge the importance
of moral hazard and adverse selection in natural catastrophe risk transfer; indeed, we rely
on such considerations to preclude the complete transfer of risk from insurer to reinsurer or
nancial markets (see Section 3). We follow Carter (1983) and Mayers and Smith (1990)
in deeming information provision to be no less important.3 Boot and Thakor examine
information provision in public markets but not in private. Subrahmanyam and Titman
compare private and public nancing for the purpose of information provision; we adapt
and modify their model for our purpose. Our model diers from theirs in many respects:
it includes variable as well as xed costs of producing information and develops an explicit
measure of information redundancy.
There is an extensive literature on the use of securitization in nancial markets for trans-
ferring catastrophe risk (D'Arcy and France, 1992; Niehaus and Mann, 1992). Such literature
has examined the advantages of nancial markets, emphasizing their risk disaggregation (Do-
herty and Schlesinger, 2002) and capital supply (Jaee and Russell, 1997) properties, and
3Anecdotes are worth what they are worth, but it is noteworthy that, in his closing remarks at a joint
industry/academia conference on new forms of risk transfers, the chairman of a large reinsurance company
felt it necessary gently to chide presenters for not having discussed what he deemed a primary role of his
rm and of reinsurers more generally, specically helping insurers structure the insurance contracts they
oer. We provide more formal evidence of information provision in Section 3.1.
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their lack of exposure to moral hazard and to default risk (Doherty, 1997; Lakdawalla and
Zanjani, 2006). Froot (2001) measures the transaction costs involved in catastrophe risk
securitization; he nds these to be quite moderate. Harrington and Niehaus (1999) and
Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips (2004) measure the basis risk involved in using standard-
ized catastrophe insurance contracts; they nd such contracts carry little basis risk for large
insurers.4 Bantwal and Kunreuther (2000) examine the role of ambiguity aversion, loss aver-
sion, and uncertainty avoidance in possibly deterring individual investors from investing in
catastrophe bonds. Diekmann (2008) argues that catastrophe bonds' yield above the risk-
free rate can be attributed to the negative shock to consumption that ensues from a large
catastrophe. Barrieu and Louberge (2009) argue that the use of catastrophe bonds can be
made more attractive by protecting bond buyers against the simultaneous occurrence of a
catastrophe and a market crash. Cummins and Trainar (2009) argue that catastrophe bonds
are most appropriate for large, correlated risks that may endanger reinsurer solvency. Finken
and Laux (2009) argue that the information-insensitive triggers often used in catastrophe
bonds have adverse selection as well as moral hazard benets. We believe our work com-
plements existing work in that it analyzes an important yet hitherto little studied problem,
that of information provision. We provide evidence of information provision in Section 3.1.
Insofar as it views reinsurance as an institution that serves to economize on information
production costs, our paper is related to the extensive literature on nancial intermediaries
as producers of information.5 Our paper extends this literature by considering the roles of
variable costs and of information redundancy. As argued above, and as will be shown below,
these play an important role in determining the preferred form of risk transfer.
Ours is not the rst paper to analyze the possibly detrimental consequences of the Hir-
shleifer Eect for nancial markets. Marin and Rahi (2000) show that the Hirshleifer Eect
may deter the introduction of new securities in otherwise incomplete markets: the additional
information revealed by the new securities may preclude valuable risk-sharing opportunities;
such detrimental eect of new information may negate its benecial eect, that of decreas-
ing adverse selection. There is no such eect in our model, because risk is transferred on
terms determined before the reinsurer and informed traders acquire information that might
4Basis risk may, however, have been responsible for the demise of some early standardized contracts; see
Cummins (2008) for further discussion.
5This literature can be said to have originated with Diamond's (1984) work on banks as delegated moni-
tors. For a nice survey of nancial intermediation, see Gorton and Winton (2003).
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otherwise preclude such transfer. Instead, much of the costly information produced in -
nancial markets has little social value: it is intended more to identify protable trades than
to guide capital allocation decisions; it is an instance of what Hirshleifer (1971) refers to as
`foreknowledge.'
3 The Model
We consider an insurer that has insured losses represented by an asset of a random (negative)
value. The insurer has to choose between reinsuring and securitizing risk.6 We assume that
the insurer cedes a fraction  of the losses he has insured: 0 <  < 1.
As noted in the Introduction, the insurer wishes to transfer risk for two reasons: one is
to take advantage of the reinsurer or the nancial market's lower cost of capital, the other
is to induce the reinsurer or traders in the nancial market to produce information that will
supplement the insurer's own information. The reinsurer produces information in order to
economize on costly capital; traders in the nancial market produce information in order to
prot from trading with liquidity traders. The information produced is communicated to
the insurer either directly by the reinsurer or indirectly through the price in the nancial
market. The insurer can then make use of this information in order to decrease the level
of costly capital he himself must hold. The cost of the information produced ultimately is
borne by the insurer, either directly through the reinsurance premium or indirectly through
a discount on the price of the securities issued in the nancial market. The purpose of
the discount is to compensate liquidity traders for the losses they will sustain to informed
traders. Liquidity traders' losses equal the informed traders' gross prots; these in turn
equal the cost of information production.7
When selecting the form of risk transfer, the insurer therefore takes the dierence in the
cost of capital of both options into account and trades o the quality of the information
obtained (which results in lower required capital) against its cost.
The remainder of the present section proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 justies the main
6Although we consider the problem faced by a primary insurer for concreteness, the analysis is identical
for a reinsurer choosing between retrocession and securitization, or for a rm choosing between insurance
and securitization.
7We shall generally specify whether a trader is informed or a liquidity trader. Where we do not, `trader'
should be understood to mean `informed trader;' omitting the adjective sometimes lightens the exposition.
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assumptions; Section 3.2 describes the underlying information structure; Section 3.3 consid-
ers the case in which only the reinsurer and traders in the nancial market but not the insurer
can produce information; Section 3.4 extends the analysis to the case in which the insurer
too can produce information. The latter two sections provide the basis for the comparison
of reinsurance and securitization in Sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Main Assumptions
Our analysis makes a number of assumptions: that it is possible to obtain information
about natural catastrophe risk, that reinsurance is at least partially motivated by the desire
on the part of insurers to obtain reinsurers' information about that risk, and that insurers
infer information about that risk from the prices at which catastrophe instruments trade in
nancial markets. How justied are these assumptions?
The informational role of reinsurance is well established: In his magnum opus on reinsur-
ance, Carter (1983, p. 10) lists `the provision of management and technical services' among
the `purposes of reinsurance.' Carter (p. 54) describes how `a large reinsurer might be able to
draw on its own experience and knowledge of a particular class of insurance to comment on
rating schedules or policy conditions proposed by a ceding company.' Specically, `companies
writing substantial reinsurance accounts . . . provide considerable assistance to small compa-
nies in the management of their business . . . Not infrequently, a member of the reinsurer's
. . . own sta will spend some time at the oce of a ceding company to help in setting up
management systems, devising schemes for transacting new classes of insurance, arranging
suitable reinsurance programmes, and generally guiding a new company in the conduct of
business.' Catastrophe risk may be considered a new or at least changing class of insurance.
Mayers and Smith (1990, p. 23) write that `reinsurance rms regularly provide a set of ser-
vices to ceding insurance companies. The reinsurer frequently has broader experience with
low probability events and provides information on pricing and claims adjustment services
in particular areas.' Mayers and Smith examine the determinants of reinsurance purchases
for a sample of 1,276 property/casualty insurance companies; they nd that geographically
concentrated insurers purchase less reinsurance than do their geographically diversied coun-
terparts. Mayers and Smith ascribe this nding to the geographically concentrated insurers'
lesser need for information: insurers active in few markets likely know their markets better
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than insurers active in many markets know theirs. The need for information appears to
dominate considerations such as taxes and bankruptcy costs, which should be exacerbated
by the geographically concentrated insurers' presumably more volatile cash ows. As May-
ers and Smith (p. 38) write, `the real-service eciency argument (which implies a negative
coecient) is quantitatively more important than the sum of the other eects through taxes,
expected bankruptcy costs, and investment incentives (which all imply positive coecients).'
Is it possible to obtain information about natural catastrophe risk? In a private com-
munication, a member of the risk management department of a large reinsurance company
describes the relation between improvements in a given catastrophe's Loss Frequency Curve
(LFC) and the number of additional employees analyzing the catastrophe, expressed as Full-
Time Equivalents (FTE):
...10% improvement with one additional FTE after 12 months
(deeper understanding of model and issues); next 5% with another
1.5 FTEs after another 15 months (research in specic areas); next
2.5% with another 2 FTEs after another 18 months (strengthen-
ing of overall risk management processes); last 2.5% with another
3 FTEs after another 24 months (optimizing the remaining details
and handling increased complexity).
Roll (1984, p. 879) nds `a statistically signicant relation . . . between orange juice returns
and subsequent errors in temperature forecasts issued by the National Weather Service for the
central Florida region where most oranges are grown.' The relation is strongest for season-
weighted PM observations: orange juice returns add most to winter evening temperature
forecasts, that is, to forecasts that pertain to those periods of day and year during which
freezes may occur; freezes that last more than a few hours kill trees and damage crops. We
interpret both the statement made by the risk manager of the large reinsurance company
and the ndings of Roll as evidence that reinsurers and traders in nancial markets can
obtain information about natural catastrophe risk.8
Do insurers infer information about natural catastrophe risk from the prices at which
catastrophe instruments trade in nancial markets? We are not aware of any evidence
8It is clearly easier to obtain information about some catastrophes than about others. Catastrophes dier
in how likely they are to occur and in what damages would be if a catastrophe were in fact to occur. For
some catastrophes such as earthquakes, little can be known about the former; much can nonetheless be
known about the latter.
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bearing on this question as such. There is, however, extensive evidence that managers make
use of stock price information to guide investment decisions (Barro, 1990; Durnev, Morck,
and Yeung, 2004; Chen, Goldstein, and Wang, 2007). Furthermore, the more informative
are stock prices, the more ecient are investment decisions, in the sense that rms that
have more informative stock prices have marginal Q's closer to optimal (Durnev et al.; Chen
et al.).9 We have no reason to believe that what is true of stock price information and
investment should not be true of catastrophe instrument information and capital.
3.2 The Information Structure
We represent insured losses by an asset of value l+ , with l  N  l; vl,   N (0; v), l < 0
and cov (l; ) = 0. An agent s, whether an insurer i, a reinsurer r, or an informed trader n,
n = 1; : : : ; N , can acquire information
is =  +
p
vs

 +
p
1  2s

; 0 6  6 1 (1)
We assume   N (0; 1), s  N (0; 1), cov (l; ) = cov (l; s) = cov (; ) = cov (; s) =
cov (; s) = cov (s; t) = 0 for s 6= t, s; t 2 fi; r; ng; vs is the variance of the error term in
the information. Note that the information acquired pertains exclusively to ; no information
can be acquired about l; this ensures that the uncertainty about losses can be no lower than
vl.
The error in the information about  consists of two parts, one perfectly correlated across
agents, , and the other perfectly uncorrelated, s. Any level of correlation between the error
terms of two agents can therefore be obtained by varying the parameter . Indeed, we have
corr (is   ; it   ) = corr

 +
p
1  2s;  +
p
1  2t

= 2 (2)
We refer to  as the degree of redundancy in the information acquired. Where  = 1, there is
no dierence whatsoever between one piece of information and the next, there is no value to
aggregating information; all information is redundant beyond a single piece of information.10
9The optimal marginal Q is not necessarily 1, because of nancing and other constraints.
10On an informal level, redundancy in information captures the extent of \thinking alike" that fund
manager Peter Lynch refers to in his famous observation about Wall Streeters going to the same cocktail
parties and, as a result, all thinking alike so that prices cannot really be ecient. We thank Charles Cuny
for suggesting this analogy to us.
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As  decreases below one, there is a value to aggregation in that aggregation decreases the
overall error in the information; information beyond a single piece of information is no longer
redundant.
Formally, consider the average error acrossN informed agents, 1
N
PN
n=1
p
vn
h
 +
p
1  2n
i
.
If vn = v for all n, its variance is
var
"
1
N
NX
n=1
p
vn
h
 +
p
1  2n
i#
= v
"
2
N2
var
"
NX
n=1

#
+
1  2
N2
var
"
NX
n=1
n
##
= v

2 +
1  2
N

(3)
Using that variance as a proxy for the uncertainty about  that remains once the information
across all agents has been aggregated, we see that there is no decrease in uncertainty where
 = 1. In contrast, uncertainty decreases in N where  < 1. Our presumption is that
less well-understood risks are those with high : aggregation does little to decrease overall
uncertainty about those risks. In contrast, risks that are well-understood in the aggregate
should have low : aggregation is eective at reducing overall uncertainty about these risks.11
We show in Sections 4 and 5 that redundancy in the information about natural catastrophe
risk aects the choice between reinsurance and securitization.
We allow vs to be chosen by agent s and assume that the agent's information acquisition
cost consists of a xed and a variable component. By incurring a xed cost of k, agent s
can acquire a signal with error variance vs = v, i.e., 1=v is the minimum precision of the
information that can be acquired. The agent can then improve his understanding of the
risk, i.e., rene the quality of his information by decreasing the variance of the error term
to vs < v, at a variable cost cs (v=vs   1). The agent's total cost of acquiring information
is therefore cs (v=vs   1) + k.12 Note that information acquisition by agent s decreases the
variance of the entire error term, reducing both correlated and uncorrelated errors, in the
same proportion.
11These are the risks for which prediction markets are likely to be eective. For a nice survey of prediction
markets, see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004).
12As in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999; p. 1060), and in the line of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we
assume that each agent acquires a single signal. This being said, the ability of each agent to improve the
quality of his information by decreasing vs is equivalent to allowing him to obtain additional signals, each
with variance v. In the special case where the error terms of the individual signals are independent, our
formulation reduces to assuming that the rst signal costs k and each subsequent signal cs. We choose the
formulation cs (v=vs   1) + k for tractability.
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We assume that cr = cn  c and distinguish between the two cases where i) ci is innite
and ii) ci is nite. We wish to provide neither the reinsurer nor traders in the nancial
market with an advantage over the other;13 furthermore, we wish to examine separately the
case of an insurer that cannot acquire information and that of an insurer that can.14
3.3 The Insurer Cannot Acquire Information
We solve for informed traders' optimal information gathering decision in Section 3.3.1 and
for the reinsurer's in Section 3.3.2; we derive the insurer's payos for both risk transfer
mechanisms in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 The Financial Market
In this section, we describe the structure of the nancial market that we consider and inves-
tigate information acquisition if the insurer decides to transfer risk by issuing catastrophe
instruments with aggregate payo (l + ) on the nancial market.15 The structure we
use closely follows Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), who generalize Kyle (1985). In the
primary market, all securities are purchased by liquidity traders.16 The secondary mar-
ket consists of N informed traders and of the liquidity traders who purchased the security
in the primary market. The N informed traders base their demand on the information
they acquire. The liquidity traders have demand z uncorrelated with all other variables,
z  N (0; vz). Prices in the secondary market are set by a competitive risk-neutral market
maker who expects to earn zero prot conditional on his information set. We are interested
in determining the number of traders that choose to become informed, N , the precision of
the information they choose to acquire, 1=v, the information reected in the price, and the
price at which the securities are issued in the primary market. As in Holmstrom and Tirole
(1993), this price is such that liquidity traders break even in expectation, accounting for the
13The assumption cr = cn may be considered a bias against reinsurance; specialization arguably makes
cr < cn.
14An alternative formulation would distinguish between the two cases ki innite and ki nite. We choose
to distinguish between variable rather than xed costs because our interest extends beyond the question of
`whether the insurer produces information' to `how much information the insurer produces.'
15Note that we do not consider the problem of optimally designing these securities. For an analysis of
optimal security design, see for example Boot and Thakor (1993), DeMarzo and Due (1999), and Fulghieri
and Lukin (2001).
16We follow Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) in making this simpli-
fying assumption.
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losses they expect to sustain to informed traders in the secondary market.
Recall that an informed trader n receives information in =  +
p
vn

 +
p
1  2n

,
where  is the uncertain amount of the loss. We conjecture an equilibrium in which trader
n submits an order of the form xn = nin and the market maker sets a price P =  l +
E [ jQ ] =  l + Q, where  denotes the price impact of order ow and
Q = xn +
NX
m=1
m6=n
im + z = xn +
NX
m=1
m6=n


 +
p
v

 +
p
1  2m

+ z (4)
denotes the total order ow received by the market maker, including liquidity trader demand
z. The market maker cannot distinguish between liquidity and informed trader demand.
Note that we consider a symmetric equilibrium, in which  and v are the same for all
informed traders.
Trader n takes the demand and the (inverse) quality of the information of the other
informed traders as given when choosing his own demand xn and his (inverse) quality of
information vn. Hence, in choosing xn, trader n solves
max
xn
E [xn [ l +    P ] jin ]  max
xn
E [xn [   Q] jin ] (5)
 max
xn
E
264xn
264   
0B@xn + NX
m=1
m6=n
im + z
1CA
375 jin
375
Solving for xn (the details are in the appendix), we have
xn = nin = n

 +
p
vn

 +
p
1  2n

(6)
where
n =
1
2
v    (N   1)
 
v + 
2pvn
p
v

v + vn
(7)
In choosing vn, trader n uses xn obtained in (6) to solve
max
vn
E
264E
264xn
264   
0B@xn + NX
m=1
m 6=n
im + z
1CA
375 jin
375
375  c v
vn
  1

  k (8)
subject to the constraint 0  vn  v. In so doing, trader n treats , , and v as constant.
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It is interesting to compare (5) and (8): both pertain to the maximization of trading
prots, the former over the choice of demand and conditional on information, the latter over
the choice of information quality and unconditionally. The trader recognizes that the quality
of the information he acquires (8) aects the level of trading prots he can expect to make
(5).
We show in the appendix that in a symmetric equilibrium (vn = v), we have
 =
v
p
N (v + v)p
vz [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v] (9)
 =
r
vz
N(v + v)
(10)
and that the rst-order condition for v is
 (2 + (N   1)2)pvzv
2
p
N
p
v + v [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]
= c
v
v2
(11)
Consider rst the price impact of order ow,  in (9). The larger liquidity trading variance, vz,
the greater the importance of liquidity trader demand in order ow, and the lower therefore
the price impact of order ow. The greater information redundancy, , the more intense the
competition between informed traders, and the lesser therefore the price impact. The larger
the number of informed traders, N , the more intense the competition between them; the
larger also the pool of information in the order ow. The former eect decreases ; the latter
increases it. Which eect dominates depends onN : whenN > N  1+2(1 2)v=(v+2v),
the competition eect dominates and  decreases in N ; the opposite is true when N < N.17
The greater the variance of losses v, the more the market maker stands to lose, and the
greater therefore the price impact of order ow.18
This last eect is reected in the aggressiveness with which informed traders respond
to information,  in (10): foreseeing the large price impact of order ow, informed traders
submit small orders when v is large. In contrast, informed traders respond more aggressively
17Note that N decreases in : the more correlated traders' information, the smaller the number of traders
required for the competition eect to dominate.
18The eect of v on  is ambiguous, since
@
@v
 p
v + v
(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2)v

=
((N   3)  2(N   1)2)v   (2 + (N   1)2)v
2
p
v + v [(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2)v]2
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to information, the greater the \camouage" they are aorded by liquidity traders (large vz),
the lesser the competition between informed traders (small N), and the higher the quality
of their information (low v).
Now consider the rst-order condition (11). Greater liquidity trading variance, vz, in-
creases information acquisition in the nancial market; as already noted, liquidity trading
provides informed traders with the means to \camouage" the trades they carry out in or-
der to prot from the information they acquire. Greater information redundancy, , also
increases information acquisition.19 To understand why, note that two properties of infor-
mation make it valuable: its quality (low v), and its uniqueness (low ). An informed trader
responds to a decrease in the uniqueness of the information (higher ) by increasing its
quality (lower v) in an attempt to maintain its trading prots. A larger number of traders
N reduces information acquisition because competition erodes trading prots.20 Note also
that since the left hand side of (11) tends to zero as N becomes large, no trader will incur
the cost of improving the quality of his information beyond 1=v in a nancial market with a
large number of informed traders: competition between traders drives the trader's expected
prot to zero, thereby precluding him from recovering any cost he may have incurred and de-
terring him from incurring that cost in the rst place. Finally, the quality of the information
acquired, 1=v, is increasing in the fraction of risk transferred,  , and in the starting quality
of the information, 1=v: more at stake induces more information acquisition; information
acquisition is impeded by lower quality starting information.21
19To see this, note that
@
@(2)

2 + (N   1)2
(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2) v

=
 
N2   1 v
[(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]2
> 0
20To see this, note that
@
@N

2 + (N   1)2p
N [(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]

=  
  
2  2+  6  42N +N22 v +  2 + (N   1)22 v
2N
3
2 [(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]2
< 0
21The impact of v on v is ambiguous, since
@
@v

vp
v + v [(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2)v]

=
 
2 + (N   1)2 v (v + 2v)  (N + 1)v2
2 (v + v)
3
2 [(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2)v]2
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As shown in the appendix, the expected prot of an informed trader is
f =

p
vzv
p
v + vp
N [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]
  c

v
v
  1

  k (12)
As one would expect, this prot is increasing in the fraction of risk transferred,  , in the
variance of liquidity trader demand, vz, in the starting quality of information, 1=v, and in
the uncertainty about the loss , v.
22 It is decreasing in the number of traders N , in the
xed and variable costs of information acquisition, k and c, and in the degree of information
redundancy, . This last eect arises because|as is well-known from the auction literature
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982)|traders earn larger prots when the information available to
them has a larger idiosyncratic error component. When  is large, the idiosyncratic error
component is small.
In equilibrium, the number of informed traders N active in the market is such that
f (N) = 0. Given the properties of f , the equilibrium number of traders is larger, the
higher  , vz and v, and the smaller v, c, k and . The information contained in the price at
equilibrium is that contained in the total order ow Q, as P =  l+ Q. This information is
Q = 
NX
n=1
in + z = N
 
 +
p
v

+ 
p
v
p
1  2
NX
n=1
n + z (13)
The securities are issued in the primary market at a discount to their expected value,
 l. The discount serves to compensate liquidity traders for the losses they expect to sustain
to informed traders in the secondary market. The discount is endogenous and equals total
information acquisition costs, N (c(v=v   1) + k).23 The issue price therefore equals
I   l  N

c

v
v
  1

+ k

(14)
As l is negative, I < 0: liquidity traders are paid to bear a fraction  of the losses.
22We have
@
@v

v
p
v + v
(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2) v

=
(N + 1)v2 +
 
2 + (N   1)2 v (3v + 2v)
2
p
v + v [(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2)]2
> 0
23Liquidity traders' expected losses equal E((P   (l+ ))z) = E(Qz) = vz. Using (9) and f (N) = 0,
we have
vz =
p
vz
v
p
N(v + v)
(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2)v = N

c

v
v
  1

+ k

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3.3.2 The Reinsurer
In this section, we investigate information acquisition if the insurer decides to transfer risk
to the reinsurer. Let the reinsurer r have net cost of capital ar. Capital is needed by the
reinsurer to maintain solvability in the face of greater than expected losses. We assume that
for each unit of risk remaining (as measured by the standard deviation of losses after the
reinsurer has acquired any additional information on the loss he deems desirable), the rein-
surer requires  units of capital. A higher  may reect more stringent capital requirements
or greater covariability of the loss with the reinsurer's existing book (Froot and Stein, 1998;
Zanjani, 2002; Froot, 2007).
The reinsurer's capital has positive net cost because of information and incentive con-
siderations that create a wedge between the internal and external costs of capital (Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Froot and O'Connell, 1997; Gron and Winton, 2001). While
such wedge exists in the nancial market too, it is much lower in that case: considerations of
information and incentives apply much more to capital invested in the shares of reinsurance
companies than deposited as margin requirement (for exchanges) or lent as principal (for
catastrophe bonds). For simplicity, we have assumed the net cost of capital in the nancial
market to be zero.
Diversication within the reinsurance company makes any discount at which the reinsurer
issues shares much smaller than the discount on the catastrophe instruments considered in
Section 3.3.1. This is the direct analogue to Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pen-
nacchi's (1993) comparison of individual stocks and stock market indices: the opportunities
for informed traders to prot from their private information are much more limited where
trading a claim on a widely diversied portfolio of catastrophe and other risks|reinsurance
company shares|than a claim on a single catastrophe.24 For simplicity, we assume the
discount on reinsurance company shares to be zero.25
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the reinsurer can acquire the same information as an in-
formed trader, at the same cost. The problem solved by the reinsurer who reinsures a fraction
24The bundling of dierent catastrophe risks within a single catastrophe instrument would reduce but not
eliminate the dierence in discounts, because of reinsurance companies' much more extensive diversication.
25Neither simplifying assumption is essential for our results; the two assumptions dramatically simplify
our analysis.
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 of insured losses l +  is
max
vr


l   arSD
h
l + 
 +pvr  +p1  2ri  c v
vr
  1

  k
= max
vr

 
l   ar

vl +
vvr
v + vr
 1
2
!
  c

v
vr
  1

  k (15)
where SD[] denotes the standard deviation of losses after incorporating any information
acquired, subject to the constraint 0  vr  v. Note that the amount of capital needed, as
represented by  times the conditional standard deviation, is decreasing in the quality of the
information acquired, 1=vr: higher quality information decreases loss uncertainty, thereby
decreasing the need for capital.
In the case of an interior solution, problem (15) has rst-order condition
ar
2
v2
(v + vr)
3
2 (vvr + vvl + vlvr)
1
2
= c
v
v2r
(16)
The preceding equation can be rewritten as
vvr
2
(v + vr)
3
2 (vvr + vvl + vlvr)
1
2
= ;   2cv
ar
(17)
The quality of the information acquired, 1=vr, is increasing in v and decreasing in vl.
26 There
is a dierence between the manner in which the reinsurer reacts to an increase in uncertainty
regarding losses about which he cannot acquire information (vl) and those about which he
can (v). The reinsurer acquires higher quality information in response to an increase in the
latter, thereby osetting at least part of the increased uncertainty; he acquires lower quality
information in response to an increase in the former, for such increase makes any information
he may acquire less valuable.
Since there is a single reinsurer, the degree of information redundancy  has no impact on
the reinsurer's optimal information acquisition strategy. Since vr is increasing in , a greater
26To see this, note that
@vr
@vl
=
vr
2 (v + vr)
2  
2vl (v + vr) +
3
2vvr

v
> 0
and
@vr
@v
=  v
2
r
v2
< 0
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net cost of capital, ar, and more stringent capital requirements, , induce more information
acquisition by the reinsurer, as higher quality information serves to economize on costly
capital.27 Finally, as in the case of the nancial market, the quality of the information
acquired, 1=vr, is increasing in the fraction of risk transferred,  , and in the starting quality
of the information, 1=v.
It is instructive to compare vr in (17) with v in (11). Unlike vr, v does not depend on vl;
v depends only on v: informed traders in the nancial market are concerned only with that
part of losses about which they can acquire information, for only such part provides these
traders with protable trading opportunities. It is possible to have both vr > v and vr < v.
To obtain the former, increase vz and concurrently increase k to keep N constant. For vz
large enough, there will be a v < vr. To obtain the latter, let k be so small and therefore N
so large as to make v = v. For large ar, vr will be less than v and therefore less than v.
3.3.3 The Insurer
Having analyzed the information gathering incentives of informed traders in the nancial
market and of the reinsurer, we can now determine the expected cost to the insurer of
using the nancial market or reinsurance to transfer risk. We do not allow the insurer
simultaneously to securitize in the nancial market and to reinsure: the separate examination
of each form of risk transfer makes for clearer understanding and starker comparison.
From (14), the expected cost to the insurer of ceding a fraction  of the losses to the
nancial market is that fraction of the expected loss l plus the combined cost of information
acquisition by informed traders, I =  l  N (c (v=v   1) + k). The benet is a reduction in
the required amount of capital arising from the fact that the insurer only retains a fraction
1   of the risk, and from the improved quality of the information. Hence, letting ai denote
the insurer's cost of capital and assuming, as for the reinsurer, that the insurer must hold 
units of capital for each unit of risk remaining, the insurer's expected payo from using the
27To see this, note that
@vr
@
=
(vlv + vlvr + vvr)
3
2
(v + vr)
2  
2vl (v + vr) +
3
2vvr

v3vr
> 0
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nancial market for transferring risk is
 i;f = (1  ) l   ai (1  )SD [l +  jQ ] +  l  N

c

v
v
  1

+ k

(18)
= l   ai (1  )

vl +
v2 + (2 + (N   1)2) vv
(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2) v
 1
2
 N

c

v
v
  1

+ k

where the second equality follows from (10) and (13), v is the solution to (11), and N is
obtained from the zero prot condition f (N) = 0. Note that the price is more informative
(SD[l+ jQ] is smaller), the larger the number of traders, N , the higher the quality of their
information, 1=v, and the lower the degree of redundancy in the information produced, .
The variance of liquidity trader demand, vz, has no direct impact on price informativeness,
but has an indirect eect through its impact on the equilibrium number of traders N and
the quality of the information they acquire 1=v.
Similarly, the expected cost to the insurer of ceding a fraction  of the losses to the
reinsurer is that fraction of the expected loss l, plus the reinsurer's capital cost, plus his
information acquisition cost, i.e.,  l  arSD [ jir ]  c (v=vr   1)  k. The benet is again
a reduction in the required amount of capital. Hence, the insurer's expected payo from
transferring risk to the reinsurer is
 i;r = (1  ) l   ai (1  )SD [l +  jir ] +  l   arSD [l +  jir ]  c

v
vr
  1

  k
= l    [ai (1  ) + ar ]

vl +
vvr
v + vr
 1
2
  c

v
vr
  1

  k (19)
where vr is given by (17).
3.4 The Insurer Can Acquire Information
We now consider the case in which the insurer too can acquire information. We assume the
insurer acquires information before either the reinsurer or traders in the nancial market
have done so; the insurer communicates this information to the reinsurer or makes it public
in the process of issuing the securities in the nancial market; the reinsurer or traders in the
nancial market then make use of the information communicated to them in deciding how
19
much information themselves to acquire.28
We assume that the insurer communicates the information he has acquired not as such but
embedded into the uncertainty about losses. Specically, the information ii is communicated
through the reduction of the variance of the part of losses  from v to vji  vvi=(v+vi) <
v. It is on the basis of this reduced uncertainty about  that the reinsurer and traders
in the nancial market now base their information acquisition and entry decisions.29 This
assumption allows us to use the results of sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, with the single dierence
that vji replaces v. We therefore have
 i;f = l   ai (1  )
"
vl +
v2ji + (2 + (N   1)2) vjiv
(N + 1)v + (2 + (N   1)2) v
# 1
2
 N

c

v
v
  1

+ k

 

ci

v
vi
  1

+ k

and
 i;r = l    [ai (1  ) + ar ]

vl +
vjivr
vji + vr
 1
2
 

c

v
vr
  1

+ k

 

ci

v
vi
  1

+ k

(20)
Note the additional term  ci (v=vi   1)   k, which reects the insurer's own information
acquisition cost. The insurer chooses vi to maximize  i;f in (20) in the case risk is transferred
through the nancial market and  i;r in (20) in case it is transferred through reinsurance.
How does the insurer's production of information aect that of the reinsurer and of
informed traders in the nancial market? Initially consider the case of reinsurance. The
(inverse) quality of the information, vi, is the solution to
d i;r
dvi
=
@ i;r
@vi
+
@ i;r
@vji
@vji
@vi
+
@ i;r
@vr
@vr
@vji
@vji
@vi
= 0
, @ i;r
@vi
+
@ i;r
@vji
@vji
@vi
=  @ i;r
@vr
@vr
@vji
@vji
@vi
(21)
28We assume that reputational concerns and ex post settling up mechanisms|retrospective rating and loss
sensitive premiums|deter the insurer from strategically manipulating the information he communicates. See
for example Doherty and Smetters (2005).
29We make this assumption in order to keep the analysis tractable. We have solved the model in the case
where the insurer communicates ii as such; the resulting expressions are too unwieldy to be of much use.
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We have
@ i;r
@vr
=  
2
[ai (1  ) + ar ]

vl +
vjivr
vji + vr
  1
2 v2ji 
vji + vr
2 + c vv2r
=  
2
ai (1  )

vl +
vjivr
vji + vr
  1
2 v2ji 
vji + vr
2 < 0 (22)
where the second equality is obtained by noting that vr solves the reinsurer's maximization
problem (15), with vji appearing in place of v. As @vr=@vji < 0 from footnote 26 and
@vji=@vi = v2= (v + vi)
2 > 0, we conclude that the expectation on the part of the insurer
that the reinsurer too will acquire information induces the insurer to acquire lower quality
information than he otherwise would (vi is larger than it otherwise would be): the RHS
of equation (21) is negative. The reinsurer, too, acquires lower quality information than
he otherwise would; this is immediate from @vr=@vji < 0 and vji < v. There is therefore
substitutability in the insurer and the reinsurer's information acquisition decisions.
Now consider the case of the nancial market. The (inverse) quality of the information,
vi, is the solution to
d i;f
dvi
=
@ i;f
@vi
+
@ i;f
@vji
@vji
@vi
+
@ i;f
@v
dv
dvji
@vji
@vi
+
@ i;f
@N
@N
@vji
@vji
@vi
= 0
, @ i;f
@vi
+
@ i;f
@vji
@vji
@vi
=  @ i;f
@v

@v
@vji
+
@v
@N
@N
@vji

@vji
@vi
  @ i;f
@N
@N
@vji
@vji
@vi
(23)
Unlike @ i;r=@vr, it is impossible to sign @ i;f=@v; it is also impossible to sign @ i;f=@N .
30
There is no general result regarding whether the (inverse) quality of the insurer's information
is increased or decreased by the expectation that informed traders too will acquire informa-
tion. Unlike the case of reinsurance, it is possible for vi to be decreased by that expectation:
an insurer who knows that informed traders will acquire information may decide himself to
acquire higher quality information. The reason the insurer may do so is in order to decrease
30We have
@ i;f
@v
=  
2
ai (1  )
"
vl +
v2ji +
 
2 + (N   1)2 vjiv
(N + 1)vji + (2 + (N   1)2) v
#  12  2 + (N   1)2Nv2ji 
(N + 1)vji + (2 + (N   1)2) v
2+Nc vv2
and
@ i;f
@N
=

2
ai (1  )
"
vl +
v2ji +
 
2 + (N   1)2 vjiv
(N + 1)vji + (2 + (N   1)2) v
#  12  vji +  2 + 2 v v2ji 
(N + 1)vji + (2 + (N   1)2) v
2 cvv   1

+ k

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the extent of the Hirshleifer eect: higher quality information provided by the insurer de-
creases entry and information acquisition by informed traders. Sucient conditions for this
to be the case are that @ i;f=@v > 0, dv=dvji < 0, and @ i;f=@N < 0.31 The rst inequality
indicates that informed traders acquire information of excessively high quality, in the sense
that the cost of such information|the discount on the securities issued|is higher than its
benet|reduced capital requirement. The second inequality indicates that, as does the
reinsurer, informed traders acquire lower quality information in response to the provision of
higher quality information by the insurer. The third inequality indicates that there are too
many informed traders in the nancial market: the associated entry costs are higher than
the benets of more extensively aggregated information.
4 Two Polar Cases
We wish to compare  i;f and  i;r for the purpose of determining the superior form of risk
transfer, that yielding the highest expected payo to the insurer. There are no general results
for this comparison, but some preliminary intuition is provided and some of the tradeos
involved are illustrated by considering the two polar cases of  = 0 and  = 1. We assume
i) k = 0 and N therefore large as well as ii) ci =1 for simplicity.
When the number of traders is large, competition erodes trading prots, and informed
traders do not acquire information beyond 1=v. Nevertheless, when  = 0, there is no
aggregate uncertainty about  for large N : as the price in the nancial market aggregates
all information, the insurer can infer from that price the exact value of . We thus have
 i;f = l   ai (1  )pvl (24)
In contrast, the reinsurer is able to prot from the information he acquires, and may therefore
select vr < v. The payo to the insurer from using reinsurance is given by
 i;r = l    [ai (1  ) + ar ]

vl +
vvr
v + vr
 1
2
  c

v
vr
  1

(25)
Hence, regardless of whether the reinsurer chooses to acquire information beyond 1=v or
31Using @N=@vji > 0 from the discussion following equation 12 and @vji=@vi > 0, the RHS of equation
(23) is positive.
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not, the insurer's payo from using reinsurance is lower than that from using the nancial
market; securitization dominates reinsurance.
On the other hand, when  = 1, aggregate uncertainty in the nancial market remains
even for large N . Since no trader acquires information beyond 1=v, the insurer's payo from
using the nancial market is
 i;f = l   ai (1  )

vl +
vv
v + v
 1
2
(26)
The expected payo from using reinsurance does not depend on , and is therefore still given
by (25). Note that since the reinsurer's incentive to acquire information is smaller than the
rst-best level, any information the reinsurer acquires is worth more than its cost from the
insurer's point of view. Thus, the insurer's prot from using reinsurance is bounded from
below by (25) with vr = v, i.e., one has
 i;r = l    [ai (1  ) + ar ]

vl +
vvr
v + vr
 1
2
  c

v
vr
  1

> l    [ai (1  ) + ar ]

vl +
vv
v + v
 1
2
(27)
Thus, when  = 1, two opposing eects operate. On the one hand, the (potentially) higher
quality of the information in the case of reinsurance favors reinsurance over securitization.
On the other hand, the zero net cost of capital of the nancial market favors securitization
over reinsurance. Which eect dominates determines the optimal form of risk transfer. It
is interesting to contrast these results with those of Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999). In
their model, when costly information is perfectly correlated across agents, private nancing
(reinsurance in our case) is always used because it avoids the duplication of eort in infor-
mation production that arises in the nancial market. In our setting, the nancial market
may nevertheless be used because of its lower cost of capital.
5 Determinants of the Preferred Form of Risk Transfer
In order to gain greater insights into the drivers of the preferred form of risk transfer, we
solve the model numerically, computing the insurer's expected payo from securitizing and
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reinsuring risk for dierent parameter constellations. We rst consider the case where the
insurer does not acquire information in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we turn to the case where
the insurer produces information.
5.1 The Insurer Cannot Acquire Information
Numerical Solution Methodology: The payo from transferring risk to the nancial
market is obtained by rst determining the optimal amount of information acquisition by
each informed trader, v, using the rst-order condition (11), taking the number of traders
N as given. The equilibrium number of traders is then determined as the largest value of
N for which the traders' expected prot (12), given their optimal information acquisition
strategy v, is nonnegative. Finally, given N and v, the insurer's payo is computed using
(18). Similarly, the insurer's payo from transferring risk to the reinsurer is obtained by
rst determining the reinsurer's optimal information acquisition strategy vr using (17). The
insurer's payo is then obtained by inserting the optimal vr into (19).
Base Case: Before analyzing the impact of the dierent parameters on the preferred form
of risk transfer, we solve the model for parameter values computed from information obtained
from Swiss Re. We view these values as loosely representing current assessment of the
distribution of losses and the information about such losses for a natural catastrophe event.
The values are (m denotes millions): l =  500m, pvl = 500m, pv = 1; 500m,
p
v =
1; 000m,  = 0:5, k = 5m, and c = 6m.32 To help interpret the parameter c that indexes
the variable cost of acquiring information, note that a value of 6m implies that the variable
cost of halving the standard deviation of the error in the information from
p
v = 1; 000m to
p
v = 500m is 18m.
We set  = 2:5, implying that the insurer and the reinsurer hold enough capital to cover
losses with a probability of slightly over 99%. Using the results of Fama and French (1997)
and information provided by Swiss Re, we set ai = 0:06 and ar = 0:05.
33 Finally, reecting
32The xed information acquisition cost k = 5m is well above the cost of licensing even a sophisticated
natural catastrophe model, for much is needed to make good use of such models. Users must improve the
quality of the input data on exposures, interpret the output, sensitivity-test their results, and understand
what key assumptions are in the model for certain types of underwriting decisions (Chordas, 2006).
33Fama and French (1997) do not provide separate gures for the reinsurance industry. Information
provided by Swiss Re suggests that reinsurers have a 100bp cost of capital advantage over insurers.
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the lack of trading in catastrophe derivatives, we set
p
vz = 1m: liquidity traders' demand
has standard deviation equal to 0.2% of expected loss.
Thus, in our base case, losses associated with catastrophes are large and highly uncertain;
the xed and variable costs of acquiring information are high; the standard deviation of
liquidity trader demand is low; and acquiring information at the level 1=v permits reducing
the uncertainty about losses by about 40%.
The results of our base case are shown in Figure 1, which presents the model's solution
as a function of the degree of information redundancy, . Specically, the six panels in
the gure report (1) the number of informed traders, N , (2) the (inverse) quality of the
information acquired,
p
v for the nancial market and
p
vr for reinsurance, (3) the loss
uncertainty facing the insurer once information has been acquired, SD [l +  jQ ] for the
nancial market and SD [l +  jir ] for reinsurance, (4) the total information acquisition cost,
N (c (v=v   1) + k) for the nancial market and c (v=vr   1)+k for reinsurance, (5) the total
capital cost, ai (1  )SD[l + jQ] for the nancial market and  [ai (1  ) + ar ]SD[l +
jir] for reinsurance, and (6) the payos to the insurer from both forms of risk transfer,  i;f
and  i;r.
Figure 1 reveals that reinsurance dominates the nancial market for all values of .
The reason is that the nancial market's capital cost advantage is not sucient to oset
its information cost disadvantage. The large information cost disadvantage arises from the
combination of the large xed information acquisition cost of 5m and the large number of
traders (between 15 and 30 depending on ) that choose to become informed in the nancial
market, resulting in total information acquisition costs of about 150m (versus about 10m for
reinsurance). The nancial market's capital cost advantage, which ranges from about 70m
for  = 0 to about 40m for  = 1, represents the net impact of two eects. First, the capital
cost for the part of risk transferred is zero for the nancial market and ar for reinsurance; this
rst eect unambiguously favors the nancial market. Second, the quality of the information
produced aects the amount of costly capital that the insurer must hold. Note that except
for very large values of , the reinsurer acquires more precise information than individual
informed traders in the nancial market. Nonetheless, for  < 0:7, information acquisition
by multiple traders yields better quality information than reinsurance, allowing the insurer
to hold less capital than he would with reinsurance. When the degree of redundancy in the
information produced is large ( > 0:7), the opposite holds.
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It is instructive to consider the impact of the degree of information redundancy . Al-
though  does not aect the reinsurer's information acquisition strategy and the cost of using
reinsurance (see Section 3), it does aect information production in the nancial market.
As  increases, the number of traders decreases (because expected prot per trader falls),
but the quality of the information produced by each trader increases. Overall, total infor-
mation acquisition costs increase, but the quality of the information available to the insurer
decreases. As a result, reinsurance dominates more strongly, the larger .
Summarizing, Figure 1 shows that when the xed information acquisition cost k is large,
reinsurance is preferred because the insurer would pay for this cost multiple times if he se-
lected the nancial market. For low , the nancial market does produce better information
than reinsurance, but it is subject to a Hirshleifer eect in the sense that the extra infor-
mation produced is not worth its cost. When the degree of redundancy in the information
is large, however, the nancial market is unable to produce better quality information than
the reinsurer in spite of its higher information acquisition costs|information production by
the reinsurer is much more ecient because it avoids duplication.
The Impact of Information Acquisition Costs: What would it take for the nancial
market to dominate reinsurance? From the above discussion, one factor that could help is a
lower xed cost of information acquisition, k. Granted, a lower k would increase the number
of informed traders, but it may decrease the product Nk. Figure 2 contrasts the solution of
the model in the base case (left panels) with that for k = 0:1m (right panels).34 With low
xed costs k, for   0:75, the number of informed traders in the nancial market is much
larger than in the base case at about 400, and the nancial market dominates reinsurance.
Two factors contribute to this eect. First, although total information acquisition costs are
still higher for the nancial market than for reinsurance, the nancial market's information
cost disadvantage is much smaller than in the base case at about 30m. Second, because
the larger number of traders provides for better quality information, the nancial market's
capital cost advantage is slightly higher than in the base case. Note that as in the base case,
the nancial market provides better information than reinsurance for  < 0:7; however, the
extra information is worth the extra cost because of the low k.
34For each of the settings considered in the remainder of this section, all parameter values that are not
mentioned explicitly are the same as in the base case. Other than those in the base case, not all the parameter
values we use are realistic. We sometimes use extreme values because such values have the merit of delivering
stark results, thereby clearly illustrating the comparative statics of the model.
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The situation when  > 0:75 is very dierent: informed traders acquire information
beyond 1=v, the number of informed traders falls sharply, and the performance of the nancial
market deteriorates signicantly. The reason is that although not very valuable because
redundant, information beyond 1=v is very costly to acquire: when k is much lower than
c, it is cheaper to have numerous people buy imprecise information than have few people
acquire precise information. However, when  > 0:75, the nancial market produces the
second outcome, making its use to transfer risk prohibitively costly. Granted, the reinsurer
acquires higher quality information than does an individual trader in the nancial market, at
a higher cost. However, that cost is incurred only once|reinsurance avoids the duplication
in information production that plagues the nancial market for large  because of the large
variable cost c.
Figure 2 considered the impact of low xed costs k. Figure 3 contrasts the model's
solution in the base case (left panels) with a situation with low variable costs c = 0:12m
(right panels). When variable costs are low, it is much more ecient for a single agent
to acquire very precise information than for numerous agents to pay the xed cost k and
acquire relatively imprecise information. Reecting this fact, reinsurance provides better
information than the nancial market for all , at a much lower cost. The better quality
of the information provided by reinsurance strongly reduces the nancial market's capital
cost advantage compared to the base case. Thus, for low c and large k, reinsurance strongly
dominates the nancial market for all .
Further analysis, not reported in a gure for brevity, reveals that the ratio c=k constitutes
a key determinant of the preferred form of risk transfer. For instance, when both c and k
are 50 times smaller than in the base case (i.e., c = 0:12m and k = 0:1m), the quality
of the information provided by reinsurance exceeds that provided by the nancial market
except when  is very small, and the total information acquisition cost is much higher for
the nancial market than for reinsurance. As a result, and as in the base case from Figure
1, reinsurance dominates the nancial market for all .
The implication of Figures 2 and 3 is that two characteristics of information production
favor the nancial market over reinsurance: highly convex information production costs (in
our context, variable costs c that exceed xed costs k), and low redundancy in informa-
tion production . The rst makes it cost-ecient to divide information acquisition among
many agents; the second ensures that duplication in information production is not a con-
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cern. The importance of information redundancy and information acquisition costs for the
choice between public and private nancing has already been analyzed by Subrahmanyam
and Titman (1999). What our analysis reveals is that in addition to the level of informa-
tion acquisition costs, their convexity is critical for this decision. The consequence is that
technological innovations in information production that aect xed and variable informa-
tion production costs dierently impact the preferred form of risk transfer: innovations that
reduce xed costs favor the nancial market, while innovations that reduce variable costs
favor reinsurance.
Liquidity Trading: There is a widespread view that the presence of numerous hedgers
and liquidity traders supports the use and development of nancial markets.35 In order to
determine whether this is indeed the case, consider the eect of increasing the volatility of
liquidity trader demand to
p
vz = 5m, ve times its initial value, while keeping all other
parameters as in the base case. The results are reported in the left panels of Figure 4. The
increased presence of liquidity traders stimulates both the number of informed traders in
the nancial market and the quality of the information that each trader acquires to such
an extent that the quality of the information reected in the price exceeds that provided
by reinsurance regardless of the degree of information redundancy. Interestingly, for  >
0:45, each trader even acquires more precise information than the reinsurer. Although the
increased information acquisition in the nancial market is favorable from a capital cost
perspective, the cost of the information produced is prohibitively large at about 500m or
more, illustrating the Hirshleifer eect in a very stark way. Thus, rather than making the
nancial market perform better, the presence of numerous hedgers and liquidity traders
causes reinsurance to be preferred.
The preceding result suggests that it may be necessary to restrict rather than encourage
liquidity trader participation in order for the nancial market to dominate reinsurance. This
is conrmed in the right panels of Figure 4, which show the model's solution when the
volatility of liquidity trader demand is reduced to
p
vz = 0:1m, one-tenth its initial value.
The nancial market now dominates for all . This nding is consistent with the success of
catastrophe bonds noted in the Introduction. Such bonds have for the most part been sold
under Rule 144A to Qualied Institutional Buyers (QIBs) and are traded in OTC markets:
35See for example Cuny (1993).
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there are few liquidity traders in OTC markets; few QIBs can be considered liquidity traders,
in the sense of consistently sustaining trading losses to informed traders.36
What does it take for the nancial market to dominate reinsurance when the variability
of hedging demand is large? The preceding analysis suggests that a very low xed cost k
may achieve this result, and Figure 5, which contrasts the case
p
vz = 5m and k = 5m
considered previously (left panels) with the case
p
vz = 5m and k = 0:001m (right panels),
reveals that this is indeed the case. Observe that when xed costs are very low, the nancial
market dominates reinsurance for   0:4, i.e., for values of  for which the number of
traders is extremely large at about 25,000, but none of the traders acquires information
beyond 1=v. As soon as individual traders begin acquiring information beyond 1=v, however,
total information acquisition costs in the nancial market become prohibitively large, and
reinsurance is preferred. Thus, the picture that emerges from Figure 5 is that when liquidity
trading demand is highly variable, the nancial market dominates only if both the xed cost
of information acquisition and the degree of information redundancy are small|these are
the same factors that were identied in Figures 2 and 3, but the required values become more
extreme, the larger
p
vz. We view the present case as representative|within the context of
our model and for low |of successful nancial exchanges.
Loss Uncertainty and Signal Precision: The preceding analysis reveals that low
liquidity trading favors the nancial market because it limits informed traders' ability to
prot from the information they acquire, reducing the severity of the Hirshleifer eect.
Intuitively, one could expect the same eect to arise if the prior uncertainty about the loss
about which information can be acquired,
p
v, is small. The left panel of Figure 6, which
shows the solution of the model when the uncertainty about the loss is reduced to
p
v = 250,
one-sixth its value in the base case, conrms this intuition. Limited gain opportunities from
trading attract fewer informed traders in the nancial market, signicantly reducing its
information cost disadvantage compared to the base case. At the same time, reecting the
fact that when the uncertainty about the loss is small, there is little gain from reducing it, the
reinsurer does not acquire information beyond 1=v. Although the insurer's payo improves
both for the nancial market and for reinsurance compared to the base case, the nancial
market's performance improvement is stronger. Thus, paradoxically, phenomena that lead
36Rule 144A dispenses from SEC registration requirements securities whose sale and trading are restricted
to QIBs; QIBs are institutions that have at least $100m under management.
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to an increase in loss uncertainty, such as global warming, may constitute an opportunity
rather than a threat for reinsurance companies.
The dominance of nancial markets for low loss uncertainty is consistent with Hagen-
dor, Hagendor, and Keasey's (2010) nding that stock market reaction to catastrophe
bond issuance is higher for issuers with less volatile loss ratios. It may provide a tenta-
tive explanation for the relative success of the catastrophe contracts traded on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange: recall from the Introduction that the contracts once trading on other
exchanges since have been delisted. Whereas these other contracts were based on actual
losses, the CME contracts are based on what are eectively expected losses.37 As (condi-
tional) expected losses are less volatile that actual losses, the relative success of the CME
contracts may be attributable the lesser production of information by informed traders where
loss uncertainty is lower.38
Note that the small initial uncertainty about the loss causes the payo from using the
nancial market in the left panel of Figure 6 to be increasing in . The reason is that as 
increases, the decline in the number of traders produces savings in information acquisition
costs that signicantly exceed the modest increase in capital cost caused by the deterioration
in information quality|when
p
v is low, the insurer does not need to hold much capital
anyway.
Figures 2 and 5 revealed that a low xed cost of information acquisition k favors the
nancial market. Since k is the cost of obtaining information of precision 1=v, one could
expect a lower v to favor the nancial market as well. The right panels of Figure 6, which
show the model's solution for
p
v = 250, one-fourth its value in the base case, reveal that
this is not the case. The intuition for this result is quite simple: when v is small, information
acquisition by a single agent produces a relatively precise estimate of the value of the loss. It
37The CME hurricane contracts are based on the CME Hurricane Index (CHI), which the CME describes
as follows: `Using publicly available data from the National Hurricane Center of the National Weather
Service, the CHI calculates the potential for damage for each ocial storm by reference to its maximum
wind velocity and size (radius).' (Emphasis added.) There is no reference to actual losses.
38To see that conditional expected losses are less volatile that actual losses, recall the relation
var [x] = E [var [x jy ]] + var [E [x jy ]]
and set x = l +  and y = iNWS where iNWS denotes publicly available National Weather Service data to
conclude
var [E [l +  jiNWS ]] = var [l + ]  E [var [l +  jiNWS ]] < var [l + ] :
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is therefore not worth paying the cost k multiple times (the outcome in the nancial market),
and reinsurance dominates.
Fraction of Risk Transferred: Figure 7 reports the model solution when the fraction
of risk transferred  is reduced to 0.2 (panel (a)) or increased to 0.8 (panel (b)). As one
would expect, reducing the fraction of risk transferred lowers information acquisition both
for the nancial market and for reinsurance. The reduction in the information produced in
the nancial market occurs both through the number of traders and through the precision
of the information that each trader acquires. The overall impact of the lower information
acquisition is a reduction of the nancial market's information cost disadvantage to about
half of its value in the base case reported in Figure 1, with the consequence that reinsur-
ance dominates much less clearly than in the base case. The opposite eects arise when
 = 0:8 (panel (b)): information production increases in both the nancial market and rein-
surance; both the number of traders and the precision of the information that each trader
acquires increase; the nancial market's information cost disadvantage widens signicantly;
and reinsurance dominates more strongly than in the base case.
Capital Costs: How does the insurer's capital cost ai aect the preferred form of risk
transfer? Obviously, an increase in ai has no eect on the quality of the information produced
by the nancial market and by the reinsurer. However, a larger ai makes economizing on
costly capital more important and therefore favors the form of risk transfer that provides
better quality information. This eect is apparent in Figure 8, which contrasts the model's
solution for the base case (left panels) with that when ai = 0:2 (right panels). Although
information production and the nancial market's information cost disadvantage are the
same in both cases, the nancial market's capital cost advantage diers. For   0:7
( > 0:7), the nancial market provides better (worse) information than reinsurance, and
the capital cost advantage is larger (smaller) for large ai than in the base case. Thus, in
this example, although reinsurance still dominates for all , the nancial market performs
comparatively better than in the base case for   0:7 and worse for  > 0:7.
Durbin (2001) and Froot (2001) suggest that a prior catastrophe that depletes the capital
of the reinsurance industry and increases the reinsurer's capital cost ar tends to favor the
nancial market. Figure 9, which contrasts the model's solution for the base case (left panels)
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with that for ar = 0:2 (right panels), reveals that this is indeed the case. A higher ar causes
the nancial market to perform better for two reasons. The rst, obvious one is that the
nancial market's capital cost advantage increases. The second reason is that in an attempt
to keep the amount of capital under control, the reinsurer reacts to the increased capital
cost by acquiring very precise information|in the right panel of Figure 9, the reinsurer
spends about 30m on information acquisition, signicantly reducing the nancial market's
information cost disadvantage.
A prior catastrophe also depletes the capital of primary insurers. Figure 10 contrasts
the model's solution for the base case (left panels) with that where, following a catastrophe,
both the insurer's and the reinsurer's capital cost increase signicantly to ai = 0:24 and
ar = 0:2 (right panels). Observe that although it still performs better than in the base case,
the nancial market does not do as well as in Figure 9. In particular, it does not dominate
reinsurance for large . The reason is that, as was shown in Figure 8, a large ai tends to favor
the form of risk transfer that produces better quality information: the insurer benets from
the extremely precise information acquired by the reinsurer, which reduces reinsurance's
capital cost disadvantage.
Finally, observe that an increase in the stringency of capital requirements  has the same
impact as a proportionate increase in both ai and ar. For example, increasing  from its
base case value of 2.5 to 10 while leaving ai and ar at their base case values of 0:06 and
0:05, respectively, has exactly the same eect as leaving  = 2:5 and setting ai = 0:24
and ar = 0:20, the situation considered in Figure 10. The fact that the nancial market
performs much better than in the base case for low  and only slightly better for large
 can be understood as follows. More stringent capital requirements have no eect on
information production in the nancial market, but stimulate information acquisition by
the reinsurer. This reduces the nancial market's information cost disadvantage for all .
At the same time, a higher  increases capital costs both for the nancial market and for
reinsurance. For each form of risk transfer, the increase is smaller, the better the quality of
the information provided. For reinsurance, where the quality of information is independent
of , this translates into a constant increase in the capital cost. For the nancial market,
where the quality of the information is decreasing in , the increase in the capital cost is more
pronounced, the larger . For instance, in the example considered in Figure 10, reinsurance's
capital cost increases to about 350m, compared to 120m in the base case. For the nancial
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market, the capital cost increases from about 40m to 190m for  = 0, and from about 70m
to about 250m for  = 1|about 20% more. The consequence is that the nancial market's
capital cost advantage increases more strongly for low .
Summarizing, the numerical analysis in this section shows that large xed information
acquisition costs k, large redundancy in the information produced , large volatility of liq-
uidity trading
p
vz, large prior uncertainty about the loss
p
v, and a large fraction of risk
transferred  tend to favor reinsurance. In contrast, a large variable cost of information
acquisition c, large noise in the information acquired
p
v, and a large reinsurer cost of cap-
ital ar tend to favor the nancial market. An increase in the insurer's cost of capital ai
favors the form of risk transfer that produces the most precise information. More stringent
capital requirements  have the same eect as a proportionate increase in ai and ar; they
tend to favor the nancial market. Finally, large redundancy in the information produced,
, favors reinsurance where loss uncertainty is high and nancial markets where it is low. To
the extent the base case parameters are representative of current conditions in the markets
for natural catastrophe insurance, our model may be viewed as providing a unied if par-
tial explanation for the success of OTC-traded catastrophe bonds and the relative failure of
exchange-traded catastrophe futures and options.
5.2 The Insurer Can Acquire Information
We now turn to the case of a large insurer that also produces information and investigate
how the insurer's variable information production cost ci aects the preferred form of risk
transfer. The solution methodology is similar to that in Section 5.1 with one addition, namely
the determination of the insurer's optimal information acquisition strategy accounting for
the response of the reinsurer and traders in the nancial market (note that the insurer's
optimal information acquisition strategy in both cases will typically dier).
The insurer's information production implies that for any parameter constellation, traders
in the nancial market and the reinsurer face lower uncertainty about  than in Section 5.1,
i.e. vji < v. Thus, based on the results for a low v in the left panel of Figure 6, one would
expect the nancial market to perform relatively better than in Section 5.1; furthermore, in
those cases where the insurer chooses to acquire very precise information (yielding a low vji,
which will typically occur for low ci), the nancial market should perform better for large .
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Figure 11, which reports the model's solution when the insurer's variable information
production cost is high (ci = 20m, left panels), and when it is low (ci = 1m, right panels),
conrms this intuition.39;40 In addition to informed traders' and the reinsurer's information
acquisition policies, we also report the insurer's information acquisition policy in the nancial
market and reinsurance solutions (the curves are labeled \Insurer, FM" and \Insurer, Re"
in the second panels from the top). When the insurer's information production cost is high,
reinsurance dominates the nancial market as it did in the base case without information
production by the insurer considered in Figure 1, but the dierence in the insurer's payo
between both forms of risk transfer is lower than in Figure 1. The reason that reinsurance
still dominates the nancial market is that although the insurer can use his own information
production to deter entry and information production in the nancial market, doing so is
extremely costly. By contrast, when the insurer has low information production costs (right
panels), he produces at moderate cost very precise information to deter entry and infor-
mation production by traders in the nancial market. This reduces the nancial market's
information cost disadvantage below its capital cost advantage, and the nancial market
is selected as the preferred form of risk transfer. As expected, greater information redun-
dancy favors the nancial market when the insurer's information acquisition cost is low: by
making informed traders' information more similar, greater information redundancy further
decreases these traders' opportunities to prot from trading, thereby further decreasing their
entry into the nancial market.
Analyzing the dierent parameter constellations considered in Section 5.1 but accounting
for information production by the insurer reveals that most of the results established previ-
ously still hold. In particular, lower xed costs k favor the nancial market (more strongly so
when ci is high because the insurer has more diculty preventing entry in that case), lower
variable costs c favor reinsurance, high liquidity trading variability
p
vz favors reinsurance
(again more strongly when ci is high, for the same reason), low loss uncertainty v favors
the nancial market (again more strongly when ci is high, for the same reason), and high
reinsurer cost of capital ar favors the nancial market. The two dierences compared to
39Note that although the two values we use for ci happen to be higher and lower than those for traders in
the nancial market and the reinsurer in the base case (c = 6m), what drives the dominance of the nancial
market or reinsurance is the level of the insurer's information acquisition costs, not how they compare to
traders' or the reinsurer's.
40The values of the parameters for the reinsurer and the nancial market are the same as in the base case
from Section 5.1. We also set ki = 5m for consistency; however, this parameter does not aect the preferred
form of risk transfer.
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the case without information acquisition by the insurer are that (1) a high minimum signal
precision (i.e. low v) favors the nancial market because it causes vji to be very low (and
therefore has the same eect as a low v, in contrast to the results in Section 5.1), and (2) a
high insurer cost of capital ai favors the nancial market for all  because the insurer's loss
uncertainty is lower with the nancial market for all . In all these cases, when the insurer's
information acquisition cost ci is low, the nancial market performs better for large , in
line with the ndings in Figure 11.
The results in Figure 4 showed that when the insurer cannot produce information, the
presence of numerous hedgers and liquidity traders causes excessive information production
by informed traders in the nancial market, and reinsurance is preferred. As shown there,
limiting the number of liquidity traders enhances the nancial market's performance. The
results in Figure 11 suggest that information production by the insurer may achieve the
same goal. Figure 12, which reports the solution of the model when the variability of
liquidity trading is high (
p
vz = 5m) and the insurer can also produce information, conrms
this intuition. When the insurer's information production cost is high (ci = 20m, left
panels), the nancial market performs signicantly worse than reinsurance as it did in the
left panels of Figure 4. When the insurer's information cost is low (ci = 1m, right panels),
the nancial market's performance improves signicantly. Further analysis, not reported
in a gure for brevity, reveals that when the insurer's information acquisition cost is even
lower at ci = 0:1m, the nancial market dominates reinsurance for all . The implication of
this result is that nancial markets are a viable solution to transfer risk not only if liquidity
trading can be limited, but also if insurers are able themselves to produce high quality
information.
6 Conclusion
We investigate the suitability of securitization as an alternative to reinsurance for the purpose
of transferring natural catastrophe risk. We characterize the conditions under which one or
the other form of risk transfer dominates. We consider the case of an insurer who seeks to
supplement the costly information it has produced about possible losses with information
obtained from a reinsurer or prices in nancial markets. Such information is valuable to
the insurer, for it decreases that insurer's costly capital requirements: the better the insurer
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understands the risk to which it is exposed, the lesser the amount of capital the insurer
needs to guard against such risk. We nd that informed traders who seek to benet from
trading in nancial markets may in some cases produce more information than warranted
by the primary objective of decreasing insurer capital requirements; there is `too much'
information. This is an instance of the `Hirshleifer Eect' (Hirshleifer, 1971). The production
of too much information at too high a cost in nancial markets is more likely i) where the
xed costs of producing information are high, ii) where the variable costs of producing
information are low, iii) where there are many liquidity traders, and iv) where losses are
highly uncertain. Redundancy in the information produced|how similar are the pieces
of information produced by informed traders in the nancial markets|favors reinsurance
where there is large loss uncertainty and securitization where there is little. To the extent
our base case parameters are representative of current conditions in the markets for natural
catastrophe insurance, our model may be viewed as providing a unied if partial explanation
for the success of OTC-traded catastrophe bonds and the relative failure of exchange-traded
catastrophe futures and options referred to in the Introduction.
Our study could be extended along several dimensions. First, one could allow the in-
surer simultaneously to reinsure and securitize. Second, one could explicitly account for the
adverse selection and moral hazard issues that exist in the reinsurance industry. Third, one
could construct a dynamic version of the model incorporating learning, thereby reecting
investors' growing familiarity with securitized catastrophe instruments. Finally, one could
investigate whether there are dierences in the degree of information redundancy across var-
ious types of natural catastrophes|earthquakes, oods, hurricanes, windstorms|in order
to assess whether some of these risks are more amenable to being securitized than are others.
The insights from our analysis tentatively may extend beyond the transfer of natural
catastrophe risk. Consider for example the transfer of credit risk through credit default
swaps (CDSs). In the wake of the nancial crisis, there has been much talk of requiring
these to be traded on exchanges, in contrast to the OTC markets in which CDS trading
hitherto has been concentrated. Our analysis suggests that the prospects for CDS exchange
trading at least partially depend on the nature and costs of information about credit risk,
the extent of liquidity trading in credit instruments, and the uncertainty of credit losses.
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Appendix
A Determination of Optimal Demand xn
Recall from (5) that trader n chooses his optimal demand xn by solving
max
xn
E
264xn
264   
0B@xn + NX
m=1
m6=n
im + z
1CA
375 jin
375 (28)
Substituting im =  +
p
v

 +
p
1  2m

and using the fact that z and m are indepen-
dent of in, this expression can be rewritten as
max
xn
xn

E [jin]  
 
xn + (N   1)E [jin] + (N   1)
p
vE [jin]

= max
xn
xn

(   (N   1)) v
v + vn
in   xn   (N   1)2
p
vn
p
v
v + vn
in

(29)
Dierentiating with respect to xn and solving yields
xn =
1
2
v    (N   1)
 
v + 
2pvn
p
v

v + vn
in (30)
which is optimal demand (6) in the text.
B Determination of the Optimal Information Acquisition Policy
vn
Recall from (8) that trader n chooses his optimal information acquisition policy vn by solving
max
vn
E
264E
264xn
264   
0B@xn + NX
m=1
m 6=n
im + z
1CA
375 jin
375
375  c v
vn
  1

  k (31)
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Substituting im =  +
p
v

 +
p
1  2m

and using the fact that z and m are indepen-
dent of in, this expression can be rewritten as
max
vn
E

xn

(   (N   1)) v
v + vn
in   xn   (N   1)2
p
vn
p
v
v + vn
in

 c

v
vn
  1

  k (32)
From (30), we have
v    (N   1)
 
v + 
2pvn
p
v

v + vn
in = 2xn (33)
Hence, problem (32) becomes
max
vn
E [xn [2xn   xn]]  c

v
vn
  1

  k
= max
vn
E

x2n
  c v
vn
  1

  k (34)
Substituting xn from (30) and using the fact that E[i
2
n] = v + vn then yields
max
vn
1
4
 
v    (N   1)
 
v + 
2pvn
p
v
2
v + vn
  c

v
vn
  1

  k (35)
Note that the rst term is decreasing in vn, indicating that there is a benet to improving
the quality of the information.
Dierentiating with respect to vn, the rst-order condition corresponding to an interior
solution reads
1
4
v   (N   1)
 
v + 
2pvn
p
v

(v + vn)
2 
(N   1)2
p
vp
vn
(v + vn) +
 
v    (N   1)
 
v + 
2pvn
p
v

= c
v
v2n
(36)
Imposing the symmetry conditions n =  and vn = v, we have
 =
v
 [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v] (37)
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Since P =  l + Q =  l + E [ jQ ],  is the coecient in the regression of  on Q, i.e.,
 =
cov (;Q)
var (Q)
=
v
p
N (v + v)p
vz [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v] (38)
Inserting this expression into (37) then yields
 =
r
vz
N(v + v)
(39)
Setting vn = v for a symmetric equilibrium and substituting  and  from (37) and (38),
the rst order condition (36) becomes
 (2 + (N   1)2)pvzv
2
p
N
p
v + v [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]
= c
v
v2
(40)
which is (11) in the text.
C Determination of Expected Prot f
From (34), given vn = v, the trader's expected prot is given by
f = E

x2n
  cv
v
  1

  k (41)
Using (9) and (10), the rst term can be rewritten as
E

x2n

= 2 (v + v)
=
 
v
p
N (v + v)p
vz [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]
!
vz
N(v + v)

(v + v)
=

p
vzv
p
v + vp
N [(N + 1) v + (2 + (N   1)2) v]
(42)
Inserting this expression into (41) yields (12).
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Figure 1: The preferred form of risk transfer in the base case.
This gure shows the solution of the model as a function of the degree of information redundancy
 for the base case parameter values l =  500m, pvl = 500m, pv = 1; 500m,
p
v = 1; 000m,p
vz = 1m,  = 2:5,  = 0:5, ai = 0:06, ar = 0:05, k = 5m, and c = 6m. The rst panel shows
the number of informed traders in the nancial market, N . The second panel reports the (inverse)
quality of the information acquired by the individual traders in the nancial market,
p
v, and by the
reinsurer,
p
vr. The third panel reports the loss uncertainty facing the insurer once information has
been acquired, SD [l +  jQ ] for the nancial market and SD [l +  jir ] for reinsurance. The fourth
panel reports the total information acquisition cost, N (c (v=v   1) + k) for the nancial market and
c (v=vr   1)+k for reinsurance. The fth panel reports the total capital cost, ai (1  )SD[l+jQ]
for the nancial market and  [ai (1  ) + ar ]SD[l+ jir] for reinsurance. The sixth panel shows
the payos to the insurer from using the nancial market and reinsurance,  i;f and  i;r.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
20
N
u
m
b
er
of
In
fo
rm
ed
T
ra
d
er
s
N
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
500
1000
In
ve
rs
e
S
ig
n
al
P
re
ci
si
on
√ v
 
 
Financial Market
Reinsurance
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
600
800
1000
In
su
re
r’
s
L
os
s
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
S
D
[l
+
δ
|.]
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−200
−100
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
os
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−150
−100
−50
0
C
ap
it
al
C
os
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−800
−700
−600
Information Redundancy γ
In
su
re
r’
s
P
ay
off
Γ
i
44
F
ig
u
re
2:
L
ow

x
ed
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
s
k
fa
vo
r
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
th
e
b
as
e
ca
se
fr
om
F
ig
u
re
1
in
w
h
ic
h
k
=
5m
.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
o
n
w
h
en

x
ed
co
st
s
a
re
re
d
u
ce
d
to
k
=
0
:1
m
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
B
as
e
C
as
e
(k
=
5m
).
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
20
0
40
0
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
L
ow

x
ed
co
st
s
k
=
0
:1
m
.
45
F
ig
u
re
3:
L
ow
va
ri
ab
le
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
s
c
fa
vo
r
re
in
su
ra
n
ce
.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
th
e
b
as
e
ca
se
fr
o
m
F
ig
u
re
1
in
w
h
ic
h
c
=
6
m
.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
o
n
w
h
en
va
ri
a
b
le
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
s
ar
e
re
d
u
ce
d
to
c
=
0
:1
2
m
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
B
a
se
C
as
e
(c
=
6
m
).
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
01020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
50
0
60
0
70
0
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
70
0
−
60
0
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
(b
)
L
ow
va
ri
ab
le
co
st
s
c
=
0
:1
2
m
.
46
F
ig
u
re
4:
L
iq
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
in
g
ad
ve
rs
el
y
a
ec
ts
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t'
s
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
h
ig
h
va
ri
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
a
d
er
d
em
a
n
d
p v
z
=
5
m
.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
w
it
h
lo
w
va
ri
a
b
il
it
y
of
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
er
d
em
an
d
p v
z
=
0
:1
m
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
050
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
50
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
12
00
−
10
00
−
80
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
H
ig
h
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
in
g
p v
z
=
5
m
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
05
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
80
0
10
00
12
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
40
−
200
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
70
0
−
60
0
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
L
ow
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
in
g
p v
z
=
0:
1m
.
47
F
ig
u
re
5:
L
ow

x
ed
co
st
s
m
it
ig
at
e
th
e
ad
ve
rs
e
im
p
ac
t
of
h
ig
h
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
in
g
on
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
h
ig
h
va
ri
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
a
d
er
d
em
a
n
d
p v
z
=
5
m
a
n
d
th
e

x
ed
co
st
s
fr
o
m
th
e
b
a
se
ca
se
,
k
=
5
m
.
P
an
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
at
io
n
w
it
h
lo
w

x
ed
co
st
s,
k
=
0:
00
1
m
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
050
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
50
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
12
00
−
10
00
−
80
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
H
ig
h
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
in
g
p v
z
=
5
m
,
h
ig
h

x
ed
co
st
s
k
=
5
m
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
012
x 
10
4
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
50
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
10
00
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
H
ig
h
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
in
g
p v
z
=
5m
,
lo
w

x
ed
co
st
s
k
=
0:
00
1m
.
48
F
ig
u
re
6:
L
ow
lo
ss
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
fa
vo
rs
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t,
b
u
t
h
ig
h
m
in
im
u
m
si
gn
al
p
re
ci
si
on
fa
vo
rs
re
in
su
ra
n
ce
.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
lo
w
lo
ss
u
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
p v

=
2
5
0
,
o
n
e-
si
x
th
th
e
va
lu
e
in
th
e
b
a
se
ca
se
o
f
F
ig
u
re
1
.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
at
io
n
w
h
er
e
th
e
m
in
im
u
m
si
gn
al
p
re
ci
si
on
ex
ce
ed
s
th
at
in
th
e
b
a
se
ca
se
,
p v
=
2
5
0
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
05
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
55
0
55
5
56
0
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
40
−
200
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
65
0
−
60
0
−
55
0
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
L
ow
lo
ss
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
p v

=
25
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
01020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
55
0
60
0
65
0
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Information
Cost
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
70
0
−
60
0
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
H
ig
h
m
in
im
u
m
si
gn
al
p
re
ci
si
on
p v
=
25
0.
49
F
ig
u
re
7:
A
h
ig
h
er
fr
ac
ti
on
of
ri
sk
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
fa
vo
rs
re
in
su
ra
n
ce
.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
w
h
en
th
e
fr
ac
ti
on
o
f
ri
sk
tr
a
n
sf
er
re
d
is
re
d
u
ce
d
to

=
0
:2
,
v
er
su
s

=
0:
5
in
th
e
b
a
se
ca
se
o
f
F
ig
u
re
1.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
at
io
n
w
h
er
e
th
e
fr
ac
ti
on
of
ri
sk
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
is
in
cr
ea
se
d
to

=
0
:8
.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
010
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
M
a
rk
et
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
10
0
−
500
Information
Cost
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
L
ow
fr
ac
ti
on
of
ri
sk
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
(
=
0:
2)
.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
02040
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
M
a
rk
et
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
30
0
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
H
ig
h
fr
ac
ti
on
of
ri
sk
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
(
=
0:
8)
.
50
F
ig
u
re
8:
H
ig
h
in
su
re
r
co
st
of
ca
p
it
al
fa
vo
rs
th
e
fo
rm
of
ri
sk
tr
an
sf
er
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
th
e
in
su
re
r'
s
lo
ss
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
is
lo
w
er
.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
th
e
b
as
e
ca
se
in
F
ig
u
re
1
in
w
h
ic
h
a
i
=
0:
0
6
.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
w
h
er
e
th
e
in
su
re
r'
s
co
st
o
f
ca
p
it
al
is
m
u
ch
la
rg
er
at
a
i
=
0
:2
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
B
as
e
ca
se
(a
i
=
0
:0
6)
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
30
0
−
20
0
−
10
00
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
90
0
−
80
0
−
70
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
H
ig
h
in
su
re
r
co
st
of
ca
p
it
al
(a
i
=
0:
2)
.
51
F
ig
u
re
9:
H
ig
h
re
in
su
re
r
co
st
of
ca
p
it
al
fa
vo
rs
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
th
e
b
as
e
ca
se
in
F
ig
u
re
1
in
w
h
ic
h
a
r
=
0
:0
5
.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
w
h
er
e
th
e
re
in
su
re
r'
s
co
st
o
f
ca
p
it
al
is
m
u
ch
la
rg
er
at
a
r
=
0
:2
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
B
as
e
ca
se
(a
r
=
0:
0
5)
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
H
ig
h
re
in
su
re
r
co
st
of
ca
p
it
al
(a
r
=
0:
2)
.
52
F
ig
u
re
10
:
H
ig
h
co
st
s
of
ca
p
it
al
fo
r
b
ot
h
th
e
in
su
re
r
an
d
th
e
re
in
su
re
r
fa
vo
r
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
fo
r
th
e
b
as
e
ca
se
in
F
ig
u
re
1
in
w
h
ic
h
a
i
=
0:
0
6
a
n
d
a
r
=
0:
0
5
.
P
a
n
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
w
h
er
e
b
o
th
th
e
in
su
re
r'
s
an
d
th
e
re
in
su
re
r'
s
co
st
of
ca
p
it
al
ar
e
m
u
ch
la
rg
er
a
t
a
i
=
0
:2
4
a
n
d
a
r
=
0
:2
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
80
0
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
B
as
e
ca
se
(a
i
=
0
:0
6,
a
r
=
0
:0
5)
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
20
0
−
10
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
40
0
−
20
00
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
10
00
−
90
0
−
80
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
H
ig
h
co
st
of
ca
p
it
al
fo
r
b
ot
h
in
su
re
r
an
d
re
in
su
re
r
(a
i
=
0
:2
4,
a
r
=
0:
2)
.
53
F
ig
u
re
11
:
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
b
y
th
e
in
su
re
r
ca
n
d
et
er
ex
ce
ss
iv
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
b
y
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t
an
d
ca
u
se
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t
to
b
ec
om
e
th
e
p
re
fe
rr
ed
fo
rm
of
ri
sk
tr
an
sf
er
.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
w
h
en
th
e
in
su
re
r
is
a
ls
o
a
b
le
to
a
cq
u
ir
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
it
s
va
ri
a
b
le
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
is
h
ig
h
,
c i
=
20
m
.
P
an
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
at
io
n
w
h
er
e
th
e
in
su
re
r'
s
va
ri
a
b
le
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
is
lo
w
,
c i
=
1
m
.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
01020
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
T
ra
d
er
s
(F
M
)
R
ei
n
su
re
r
In
su
re
r,
F
M
In
su
re
r,
R
e
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
70
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
H
ig
h
in
su
re
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
s
( c
i
=
20
m
).
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
024
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
T
ra
d
er
s
(F
M
)
R
ei
n
su
re
r
In
su
re
r,
F
M
In
su
re
r,
R
e
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
50
0
55
0
60
0
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
40
−
200
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
65
0
−
60
0
−
55
0
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
a
n
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i (b
)
L
ow
in
su
re
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
s
( c
i
=
1 m
).
54
F
ig
u
re
12
:
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
b
y
th
e
in
su
re
r
ca
n
al
le
v
ia
te
th
e
n
eg
at
iv
e
im
p
ac
t
of
h
ig
h
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
ad
in
g
va
ri
ab
il
it
y
on
th
e

n
an
ci
al
m
ar
ke
t.
P
an
el
a
sh
ow
s
th
e
so
lu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
w
h
en
th
e
va
ri
ab
il
it
y
o
f
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
a
d
in
g
is
h
ig
h
(p
v z
=
5m
)
a
n
d
th
e
in
su
re
r
is
a
ls
o
a
b
le
to
a
cq
u
ir
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
,
al
b
ei
t
at
a
h
ig
h
va
ri
ab
le
co
st
(c
i
=
20
m
).
P
an
el
b
co
n
si
d
er
s
a
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
w
h
er
e
th
e
in
su
re
r'
s
va
ri
a
b
le
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
is
lo
w
(c
i
=
1
m
).
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
050
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
T
ra
d
er
s
(F
M
)
R
ei
n
su
re
r
In
su
re
r,
F
M
In
su
re
r,
R
e
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
60
0
80
0
10
00
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
40
0
−
20
00
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
10
00
−
80
0
−
60
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(a
)
H
ig
h
li
q
u
id
it
y
tr
a
d
in
g
va
ri
ab
il
it
y,
h
ig
h
in
su
re
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ac
-
q
u
is
it
io
n
co
st
s
(p
v z
=
5m
,
c i
=
20
m
).
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0510
Numberof
Informed
TradersN
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
0
50
0
10
00
InverseSignal
Precision
√
v
 
 
T
ra
d
er
s
(F
M
)
R
ei
n
su
re
r
In
su
re
r,
F
M
In
su
re
r,
R
e
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
50
0
55
0
60
0
Insurer’sLoss
Uncertainty
SD[l+δ|.]
 
 
F
in
an
ci
al
M
ar
ke
t
R
ei
n
su
ra
n
ce
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
500
Information
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
10
0
−
500
Capital
Cost
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
−
70
0
−
60
0
−
50
0
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
ed
u
n
d
an
cy
γ
Insurer’s
PayoffΓ
i
(b
)
H
ig
h
n
oi
se
li
q
u
id
it
y
va
ri
ab
il
it
y,
lo
w
in
su
re
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ac
q
u
i-
si
ti
on
co
st
s
(p
v z
=
5
m
,
c i
=
1
m
).
55
